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GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT
IV. The History of Gideon v. Wainwright
Abe Krash
Anthony Lewis
A. The Gideon Brief2 23
When Tony Lewis and I were chatting before the panel this
morning, he was trying to cheer me up a little by telling me it
wasn't such a long time ago. I was reminded of Judge Arnold's
remark. He said, "As I grow older, I find that the things I re-
member best never took place."
The fact is that I have a very vivid memory of that summer
in 1962 when I worked on the Gideon brief. Abe Fortas was ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court as counsel to represent Gideon,
and I was a young lawyer working at Arnold, Fortas & Porter.
Fortas invited me to work with him on the brief after the Su-
preme Court had granted certiorari. One must appreciate that
Gideon's petition was handwritten and that there were about
1,200 petitions of that sort before the Court. The Court, in
granting certiorari, had asked counsel to consider whether the
Court should reverse Betts v. Brady224 - the case which had
decided that a defendant was entitled to counsel in state crimi-
nal proceedings only on a showing of special circumstances. The
order granting certiorari, and the appointment of Abe Fortas,
were clear signals that momentous things were about to take
place.
Abe Fortas was not a specialist in criminal law, and yet, in
thinking of his life, it is worth recalling that he was involved as
counsel or judge in three of the greatest criminal cases of the
past half century. He was appointed counsel for petitioner by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
a case called Durham v. United States.25 In its opinion, the
court announced a new test for the insanity defense in criminal
223. This section of the conference was presented by Abe Krash - Partner, Arnold
& Porter, District of Columbia; LL.B., University of Chicago, 1949; Member, President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, 1965-66; Visiting Lecturer in Law,
Yale Law School, 1978-79, 1981, 1983; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center, 1989-90.
224. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
225. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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cases. Fortas argued that the insanity defense should be re-
formed to take into account developments in psychiatry. Dur-
ham was one of the early great cases on the insanity defense,
and it had "a tremendous and continuing impact upon the
course of the debate 2 26 concerning criminal responsibility. Sec-
ond, he was, of course, counsel in Gideon. Third, when Fortas
was an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, he wrote the
opinion for the Court in the Gault case which involved the right
of juveniles to counsel.227 In these three great cases, Abe Fortas'
imprint can be seen very distinctly.
Fortas was a marvelous advocate, and when he called me in
and we began to ponder the Gideon case, the questions that he
put to me and to my colleagues who were working on the case
were these: First, how do we convince the Court that changing
the existing rule, so as to provide counsel in all criminal cases, is
not a radical step? Second, how do we deal with the disagree-
ment within the Court, with respect to federalism? Because he
wanted to get a unanimous Court, both questions needed an-
swers. On the first question, that is, how do we show the Court
that we were not seeking a radical ruling, you must first remem-
ber what the situation with respect to the right to counsel was at
that time. The Supreme Court had decided as of 1962 that in all
federal criminal prosecutions, accused persons were entitled to a
lawyer, whether it was a capital case or a noncapital case.228 Sec-
ond, the Court had decided that in state criminal cases involving
capital offenses, the accused was entitled to counsel whether or
not he could afford one.229 Third, the Court had decided that in
state felony prosecutions, where there were special circum-
stances presented, the accused was entitled to counsel.23 ° Special
circumstances was a category that kept changing and growing.231
It involved such things as the complexity of the charge, whether
the accused was a young person, the experience of the accused
and so on.232 This category was a rapidly expanding one.
226. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 83 (1967).
227. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
228. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1962).
229. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
230. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
231. See, e.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 474-77 (1944).
232. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1962); Hudson v.
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Fortas wanted to convince the Court that a ruling for
Gideon would not be a revolutionary step; it would be an evolu-
tionary step. Our position was that granting a right to counsel in
all state felony cases would not be a major transformation. I
think that was the first significant point.
The second problem was how to deal with the federalism
issue. In the Supreme Court, at that time, there wag a great
ongoing debate as to the status of the Bill of Rights under the
fourteenth amendment. The issue was whether the fourteenth
amendment incorporated all of the Bill of Rights or only some of
them. The Court had held that some were incorporated but not
all.233 We had to convince those Justices who were reluctant to
expand the incorporation doctrine. Also, there was a division
within the Court as to whether an incorporated right was
granted in the same way against a state as it was against the
federal government." 4 If the right to counsel was incorporated
in the fourteenth amendment, would it be subject to the same
requirements in state cases as in federal prosecutions. The great
insight that Abe Fortas had on this problem of federalism can be
expressed this way: The special circumstances rule is a rule that
those persons who favor federalism should oppose. Under that
rule, after each person was tried and convicted in a state court
and his conviction affirmed on appeal, a postconviction petition
was presented to a federal court, and a federal judge was re-
quired to review what the state court judge did. The phrase we
used in the brief to describe this process was "ad hoc and post
facto. 23 5
In other words, in every case, under the Betts rule, a federal
court looked at what happened in the state court case, and it did
so after the fact. What could be more irritating to state judges?
What could be more contrary to federalist principles than to
have a federal court reviewing, case by case, the actions of state
court judges? Fortas's insight was that the special circumstances
rule was anti-federalist and that a rule requiring the appoint-
North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 701-04 (1960).
233. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-53 (1947), overruled by, Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
234. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-17 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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ment of counsel in all cases would be less of an irritant. That
profound insight was an insight that persuaded Justice
Harlan, 36 who was reluctant to expand the incorporation doc-
trine. As you will recall, the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon
was unanimous.
It seems to me that the significance of Gideon is that, not-
withstanding the criticisms that have been made of Supreme
Court opinions of the Warren era, the Gideon decision has been
immune from attack even by the most severe critics of the War-
ren Court. Some critics have urged the Court to abandon the
decisions excluding evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure. 3 Various critics have assailed the Miranda rule.23 8
Other decisions of the Warren Court with respect to the rights
of the accused are under assault.23 9 But no responsible voice to-
day urges that Gideon should be reversed. The right to counsel
in criminal prosecution is now accepted as a fundamental basic
right. Even the most conservative, even the most extreme revi-
sionist critics of the Court, do not say today, "we should aban-
don the doctrine of the Gideon case." If one stands back for a
minute and looks at the sweep of history, the Gideon case is a
decision of enormous consequence and importance. It is a
landmark in American constitutional law because it affirmed a
right that is now fundamentally accepted in our society.
In that sense, it is appropriate to celebrate Gideon. The Su-
preme Court upheld the right to counsel in a unanimous deci-
sion which a quarter of a century later remains unchallenged. I
think that is a development of profound and enduring
significance.
Let me say just a word about the issues with respect to the
right to counsel today. The issues, of course, have greatly
changed since 1962. As with any great decision, one begins to
refine and develop it. The first question that emerged after
236. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349-52.
237. Note, Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEo. L.J. 489, 594 (1989)[hereinafter
Eighteenth Annual Review]; United States v. Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292, 297 (2d Cir.
1986).
238. Eighteenth Annual Review, supra note 237, at 641. See also Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
239. Eighteenth Annual Review, supra note 237, at 594.
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Gideon is what do we mean by the right to counsel? Is any law-
yer sufficient, or do we mean that the accused is entitled to ef-
fective assistance of counsel? How do you give content and
meaning to the right? The second question is how far does the
right to counsel extend? When we say that you have a right to
counsel of your choice, what does that mean? That is the issue
involved in the Monsanto"" case recently decided in the Second
Circuit under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act.241 This statute
provides that, in certain circumstances, a defendant's assets can
be forfeited.242 The question is, can you take away a man's assets
so that he can't pay counsel of his choice? Obviously, persons of
limited means or indigent persons can't choose counsel in the
same way a person of means can. What then does it mean to say
that you have a right to counsel? And then there is, of course,
the issue which Professor Kamisar addressed: to what kinds of
proceedings does the right to counsel extend? How far should we
go with it? In a fair and just society may a woman be deprived
of the right to her child without the assistance of a lawyer? Is it
just that persons who have been convicted of capital offenses
and who are then engaged in postconviction proceedings do not
have the benefit of counsel? Is that the kind of society we want
to have?
It must be emphasized that Gideon was a criminal case and
there are difficult questions concerning the right to counsel in
civil cases. Gideon was not an equal protection case. It was a
case involving the rights of accused persons in state criminal
prosecutions. However, it has had emanations which can be said
to extend beyond that. Those issues are the issues of today.
The point I would like to leave you with is that I think it is
appropriate to celebrate Gideon because it does survive and re-
mains as a beacon in the law. After a quarter of a century, it is a
decision which I still regard as among the great moments of my
professional life.
240. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657
(1989).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
242. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1403-04.
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B. A Journalist's View 243
I am expected to be the celebrator here today. I will do that
rather briefly despite Yale Kamisar's criticisms. He may well be
right but, looking back, I cannot help being romantic about what
happened in the Gideon case. After the Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case and appointed Abe Fortas as counsel to this
impoverished, longtime resident of the penitentiary, I followed
the progression of the case; the briefing and arguing by Abe For-
tas, Abe Krash, and John Hart Ely, a young Yale law student
who was there for the summer and has since gone on to become
a Harvard law professor, Dean of the Stanford Law School, and
now a professor at Stanford. I think anyone who had watched
the preparation of this case was impressed with the care, the
vision, and the imagination used in briefing a case that, frankly,
I think all of us knew really had to be won. It was not a case
where you were desperately trying to save a client. It was a case
where you were trying to present the Court with the soundest
and most convincing reasons for doing what it seemed set to do.
I think if you had seen that process, you would have felt proud
of law and lawyers in this country and yes, a bit romantic about
it, as I was.
I dug out the piece of the argument in the Supreme Court
where Abe Fortas said, as he concluded, "Betts against Brady
was wrong when decided; I think time has illuminated that fact.
But I think that perhaps [time has now made it possible for] the
correct rule, the civilized rule, the rule of American constitution-
alism, the rule of due process," '244 to be stated by this Court. I
think we are all entitled to feel retrospectively celebratory even
though we fully recognize the inadequacies that Yale Kamisar
has pointed out.
I want to tell you a little anecdote to further indicate my
feelings about this matter: what happened to me in Hollywood,
not usually a place of reality. This time it was.
After the case and after my book, David Rintels, a screen
243. This section of the conference was presented by Anthony Lewis - Columnist,
New York Times; Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Author, GIDEON'S TRUMPET;
B.A., Harvard University, 1948.
244. Petitioner's Rebuttal Argument at 58, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
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writer and director, decided to make a film about the book.
David wrote the screenplay and arranged to have it produced. It
starred Henry Fonda as Gideon. He asked me whether I would
like to watch the filming and I did. I had nothing to do with it
except to sit there and to observe this rather fascinating process.
Much of the time was spent in the Chino Prison, a large Califor-
nia prison where many scenes were shot, although many of these
were later cut. I discovered, to my amusement, that three or four
prisoners at Chino had personally known Clarence Earl Gideon,
even though he was a prisoner in Florida. This is perhaps indica-
tive of a society unto itself where many prisoners have been in
many prisons.
The scene of Gideon's second trial was filmed in an old
courthouse in a Los Angeles suburb. You remember, of course,
that he was convicted at his first trial. After he won his appeal
in the Supreme Court, he had a second trial. Gideon refused the
offer of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to represent
him without charge, saying, with characteristic stubbornness,
that he didn't want the ACLU to represent him. The judge then
appointed a local Panama City, Florida lawyer named Fred Tur-
ner to represent him. The actor playing Fred Turner in this
scene was a young Hollywood character actor named Lane
Smith. Lane Smith was very industrious. He really wanted to get
the part right. He asked what Fred Turner was like during that
trial. I proceeded to describe him as a rather dapper man; he
reminded me of Fred Astaire a bit. Lane listened.
Then the scene took place. The actor jurors sat in the jury
box, and Lane Smith came on with a flower in his buttonhole,
rolling a pen between his fingers, looking very confident and
debonair. A witness for the prosecution took the stand. This wit-
ness, a taxi driver named Preston Bray, answered a phone call
from Gideon and picked him up by request at 4:00 A.M. the
morning of the break-in at the Bay Harbor Pool Room in Pan-
ama City. The prosecutor elicited from the driver, on direct ex-
amination, the fact that Gideon said to Bray, "Just remember
you haven't seen me. Don't tell anybody you saw me."
I had forgotten this. It was years later and I thought to my-
self, that's very damaging. Fred Turner stands up, rolls that pen
between his fingers and says, "Mr. Bray, did Gideon ever say
that to you before?" "Yes, he says it all the time." Well, that put
1990]
7
386 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:327
a slightly different light on it. Turner then said, "Mr. Bray, why
do you suppose he says that?" The cab driver says, "I think it's
woman trouble." Turner, sort of looking over at the jury, rolls
the pen and says, "I guess we know about that." And as I was
sitting there, they said, "cut." That was the end of the scene. I
turned to the person next to me and said, "By God, a lawyer
really does make a difference."
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/4
